Slotting allowances are lump-sum payments that manufacturers make to retailers for shelf space. They have become increasingly widespread in recent years, particularly in the grocery industry. A popular view is that these payments arise because there are more products to choose from than can be profitably carried given the availability of shelf space. Under this view, slotting allowances arise because of the scarcity of shelf space. In this paper, we show that the causality can also go the other way; the scarcity of shelf space may in part be due to slotting allowances. This has policy implications. Because fewer products can be carried when shelf space is scarce, it follows that slotting allowances may be anticompetitive even when their effect on retail prices is ambiguous. JEL Classification Codes: D43, L13, L14, L42 * We thank seminar participants at Texas A&M for helpful comments. Marx can be reached at the Fuqua
Introduction
The typical supermarket has room for less than 30,000 products, and yet, at any given time, there are over 100,000 products to choose from.
1 Retailers do their best to distinguish between those products that are likely to fail in their local area and those that are likely to succeed but, even in the best of circumstances, they are often left with many more viable products than can be profitably carried. When this happens, a retailer needs some mechanism (formal or informal) to help in the selection process. One practice that has become widespread in recent years is the practice of putting one's shelf space up for bid and letting the manufacturers compete for the retailer's patronage. The manufacturers who offer the best deals to the retailer get the shelf space. Typically, the deals include potentially large, upfront payments that are independent of the retailer's subsequent quantity purchases.
These upfront payments are referred to in the trade-press literature as slotting allowances.
Slotting allowances have received a lot of attention in antitrust circles, and there is a growing academic literature that seeks to identify their procompetitive and anticompetitive effects. 2 One branch of the literature considers the effects of slotting allowances on the retailer's choice of which products to carry. A concern among policymakers is that large, dominant firms will buy up the scarce shelf space with an eye towards excluding their smaller rivals from the market. 3 Under this view, large firms will win the shelf-space bidding wars not necessarily because they make better products, but because they are willing to pay more to protect their monopoly rents than small firms are willing to pay to be competitive (see Shaffer, 2003 , for a formalization of this view). In a related view, the large firm may have easier access to capital markets or face lower interest rates, giving it an advantage over smaller rivals. In either case, it is argued that products that may be more socially beneficial are being excluded. The opposing view is that slotting allowances can be thought of as the market price of a scarce asset (shelf space) that, according to traditional price theory, has optimal allocative properties (see Sullivan, 1997) . Under this view, the firms that offer the best deals will be the ones whose products generate the largest private and, hopefully, social benefit, and thus only the manufacturers of the best products will obtain shelf space.
Both viewpoints, however, take as given the scarcity of shelf space and imply that slotting allowances arise in response to this scarcity. In contrast, in this paper, we show that the scarcity of shelf space may in part depend on the availability of slotting allowances, which reverses the typically assumed direction of causality. We show that the retailer is more likely to limit its shelf space in an environment with slotting allowances than without. Although this finding represents a significant departure from conventional thinking on slotting allowances, the idea we wish to explore is straightforward and comes from the theory of rent-shifting. 4 The choice of how much shelf space to build can be viewed as a strategic decision by the retailer. By limiting its shelf space, a retailer can force manufacturers to compete more vigorously for its patronage, which then allows it to extract from them better terms of trade.
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Slotting allowances can help in the transfer of surplus because they allow the surplus to be transferred more efficiently. In contrast, without slotting allowances, a retailer's ability to shift rents is less effective and the main drawback of a shortage of shelf space-a smaller overall joint profit due to the reduced number of products carried-becomes more salient.
Our model has implications for antitrust policy. In the conventional way of thinking, the concern is whether a dominant firm can plausibly induce a smaller rival to exit by buying up scarce shelf space. Reasoning that the dominant firm will not buy up extra shelf space unless it can be assured that its rival's product is the one being excluded and not some 4 The use of contracts to shift rents among vertically related firms was first studied by Aghion and Bolton (1987) . See also Innes and Sexton (1994) , Spier and Whinston (1995) , and Marx and Shaffer (2004a) . 5 The result that the retailer might want to commit not to buy from all manufacturers, in order to obtain better terms of trade from the ones that it does buy from, can be found in O' Brien and Shaffer (1997) . See also Dana (2004) and Inderst and Shaffer (2004) . The mechanism at work in this paper, however, is fundamentally different. In these other models, the contracting among firms takes place simultaneously. In contrast, we consider contracting that occurs sequentially, which allows for the possibility of rent shifting. unrelated product, the focus of antitrust scrutiny has been on the ancillary provisions that sometimes accompany contracts with slotting allowances. For example, a contract in which a manufacturer promises to pay a retailer a lump-sum amount with no mention of its rivals' products is looked upon more favorably than a contract in which a manufacturer offers a retailer a lump-sum payment in exchange for contingencies on the retailer's sales of rival products. 6 In our model, a prohibition of ancillary provisions in contracts that mention rivals would be ineffective, and it would not address the fundamental problem. This is because the source of the problem is the scarcity of the shelf space itself and not how the shelf space is allocated among the various products. By limiting its shelf space, the retailer links all products, whether or not they are related in the eyes of consumers. Thus, regardless of whether there are ancillary provisions in a particular manufacturer's contract that identify who is a competitor and who is not, some products will necessarily be excluded. Under this view, the retailer is to blame and the exclusion is best seen as being retailer induced.
Although slotting allowances are anticompetitive in our model, they do not affect the prices consumers pay, and they do not lead to inefficiencies in the product-selection process.
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Prices are not affected because a manufacturer obtains its shelf space at the expense of an unrelated product, leaving market conditions unchanged, and the product-selection process is not distorted because the retailer will carry the same set of products whether or not slotting allowances are feasible, provided shelf space is similarly scarce. Instead, slotting allowances are anticompetitive in our model precisely because slotting allowances may contribute to the retailers' shortage of shelf space, leading to a reduced variety of products sold to consumers.
Other explanations of slotting allowances either tend to be specific to new products, or are unrelated to whether shelf space is scarce. 8 For example, in the case of new products, one 6 To give an example, consider a contract in which a manufacturer offers to pay the retailer a substantial lump sum if the retailer agrees to purchase a certain percentage of its requirements from the manufacturer, e.g., 80%. Such a contract features both a slotting allowance and a market-share discount. In its 2001 report on slotting allowances, the Federal Trade Commission expressed concern that this might lead to inefficient exclusion and that consumer prices would be higher because of the concomitant decrease in competition.
7 This contrasts with the view that slotting allowances may lower consumer prices because they are an efficient way for the retailer to equate the supply and demand of shelf space (Sullivan, 1997) , and the view that slotting allowances may raise consumer prices because otherwise retailers would use their bargaining powers to negotiate lower wholesale prices, which would then be passed through to consumers (Shaffer, 1991) . 8 There is little empirical literature on the subject, mostly because of the lack of data, and what there is explanation is that slotting allowances serve as a screening device to enable a downstream firm to distinguish high quality products from low quality products, and another explanation is that slotting allowances allow for the efficient sharing of the risk of new product failure.
The literature in this vein includes Kelly (1991) , Chu (1992) , Sullivan (1997) , Lariviere and Padmanabhan (1997) , and Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon (2000) . Slotting allowances have also been posited to arise when retailers have all the bargaining power vis a vis their upstream suppliers. Shaffer (1991) suggests that retailers will use their bargaining power to obtain slotting allowances rather than wholesale price concessions in order to avoid dissipating their gains when competing against other downstream firms; and in a model in which one upstream firm sells to multiple competing downstream firms that can make take-it-or-leave-it offers, Marx and Shaffer (2004b) show that slotting allowances arise in equilibrium whenever there is asymmetry downstream (either on the demand or cost side) and always lead to exclusion in the sense that the manufacturer does not obtain distribution at all retail outlets.
In contrast, our model applies to any product, new or established, that requires shelf space, and we find that slotting allowances arise only when manufacturers have bargaining power. We posit that slotting allowances go hand-in-hand with the scarcity of shelf space; slotting allowances are not observed if shelf space is plentiful, but they are observed if shelf space is scarce. However, instead of concluding that slotting allowances arise because of the scarcity of shelf space, we show that slotting allowances may actually be contributing to the scarcity of shelf space. The extent to which they contribute depends on the retailer's bargaining power. Surprisingly, we find there is an inverse relationship between a retailer's bargaining power and slotting allowances. The more bargaining power a retailer has, the less likely it is to limit its shelf space as a means of extracting rent. Slotting allowances do not arise, for example, if the retailer can make take-it-or-leave-it offers. This may explain why some retailers such as Wal-Mart do not avail themselves of these payments.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We set up the model and introduce notation in Section 2. In Section 3, we solve for the equilibrium payoffs of the game without slotting allowances. We then show in Section 4 that the retailer may have an incentive to limit its tends to focus on new products (see Gundlach and Bloom, 1998; Rao and Mahi, 2003; and Israilevich, 2004) .
shelf space in order to extract better terms of trade, and that slotting allowances weakly increase these incentives. We discuss the policy implications of our model in Section 5.
Model
The simplest model in which to capture the interaction between slotting allowances and scarce shelf space is one in which there are two manufacturers, X and Y, and a single retailer. One can think of the retailer as having monopoly power over some set of consumers.
Consumers shop at their neighborhood store, for example, and choose what to buy and how much to buy, given the set of products and associated retail prices that are offered to them.
Manufacturer X produces product X and manufacturer Y produces product Y . If the retailer purchases quantity x of manufacturer X's product and quantity y of manufacturer Y 's product, then manufacturers X and Y incur costs c X (x) and c Y (y), respectively. We assume that c X (·) and c Y (·) are increasing, continuous, and unbounded, with c
On the demand side, we assume the products are unrelated. Thus, an increase in the retail price of product X does not affect demand for product Y and vice-versa. As we shall see, this implies that the firms are rivals only when they are competing for the same shelf space.
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We consider a four-stage game. In stage one, the retailer makes its shelf-space decisions and slotting allowances, if any, are offered by the manufacturers. We conceptualize the retailer's shelf space as being divided into slots of fixed width and, for simplicity, we assume that the retailer has at most two slots available to carry the two products. Contract negotiations take place in stages two and three. In stage two, the retailer and manufacturer i, i ∈ {X, Y }, negotiate a contract T i for the purchase of product i.
Manufacturer j, j ∈ {X, Y }, j 6 = i, observes T i and then in stage three negotiates with the retailer a contract T j for the purchase of product j. The assumption that manufacturer i's contract is observable to manufacturer j allows us to examine the interplay of rent-shifting incentives, slotting allowances, and shelf-space decisions, which is the focus of the paper.
We place no restrictions on the form of the contracts, other than to assume that each contract specifies the retailer's payment solely as a function of how much the retailer buys of that manufacturer's product, e.g., T X : R + → R ∪ {∞}, and similarly for T Y . Thus, we do not allow contracts to depend on the rival's quantity. 11 It may be, for example, that the rival's quantity is not easily observable or verifiable by the manufacturer, or it may be that such contracts would automatically be flagged for scrutiny by antitrust authorities, especially when they are combined with slotting allowances (see the discussion in the introduction).
In stage four, the retailer announces its quantity choices, trade occurs, and the retailer pays manufacturer X according to T X and manufacturer Y according to T Y . If the retailer does not have a contract with manufacturer i, manufacturer i's payoff is zero. Otherwise, 10 Slotting allowances are typically offered in exchange for a pre-specified amount of shelf space and length of time for which the firm's product must be displayed. We simplify here by abstracting from square footage (slots are indivisible), and we assume that the length of time for which the product must be on display is for the duration of the game. Thus, we use the terms buying and renting shelf space synonymously.
11 As Marx and Shaffer (2004a) show, whether or not this restriction limits the amount of surplus that can be extracted from the second manufacturer depends on several factors including the relationship between the manufacturers' products, whether below-cost pricing is feasible, and the bargaining parameters. manufacturer i's payoff is T i (z) − c i (z), where z is the quantity purchased of i's product.
Let R(x, y) denote the retailer's maximized revenue if it purchases quantities (x, y), R X (x) denote the retailer's maximized revenue if it purchases quantities (x, 0), and R Y (y) denote the retailer's maximized revenue if it purchases quantities (0, y). Then our assumptions imply that R(x, y) = R X (x) + R Y (y) if shelf space is plentiful and R(x, y) = max{R X (x), R Y (y)} if shelf space is scarce. If the retailer has contracts with both manufacturers, then its payoff ignoring any slotting allowances is R(x, y)−T X (x)−T Y (y). If negotiations with manufacturer Y fail, the retailer's payoff is R X (x) − T X (x). If negotiations with manufacturer X fail, the retailer's payoff is R Y (y) − T Y (y). If negotiations with both manufacturers fail, the retailer's payoff is zero. We assume that R i (·) is continuous and bounded, with R i (0) = 0. In the negotiation between the retailer and manufacturer i, we assume that the two players choose T i to maximize their joint payoff, and that the division of surplus is such that each player receives its disagreement payoff (which we define below) plus a share of the incremental gains from trade (the joint payoff of the retailer and manufacturer i if they trade minus their joint payoff if negotiations fail), with proportion λ i ∈ [0, 1] going to manufacturer i.
12 Our assumption of a fixed division of the incremental gains from trade admits several interpretations. For example, if manufacturer i makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the retailer,
If the retailer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to manufacturer i, then λ i = 0.
And if the retailer and manufacturer i split the gains from trade equally, then
We solve for the equilibrium strategies (we restrict attention to pure strategies) of the retailer and manufacturers X and Y by working backwards, taking our assumptions about the 12 These assumptions are consistent with most commonly used bargaining solutions. For example, the bargaining solutions proposed in Nash (1953) and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) satisfy these conditions. outcome of negotiations as given. The equilibrium we identify corresponds to the subgameperfect equilibrium of the related three-stage game in which the assumed bargaining solution is embedded in the players' payoff functions. For subgame perfection, we must restrict attention to contracts such that optimal quantity choices for the retailer in stage four exist.
Solving the model
We begin by solving for the equilibrium payoffs of the firms for the case in which the retailer retains control of its shelf space after stage one. This case will then provide a benchmark against which to examine the role of slotting allowances on the retailer's shelf-space decisions.
Stage four-retailer's quantity choices
Consider first the case in which the retailer has contracts with both manufacturers. In this case, we denote the retailer's quantity choices by (
where
Note that if shelf space is plentiful, then the retailer's profit-maximizing choice of x will depend on T X only, and analogously for the profit-maximizing choice of y. The dependence on the other manufacturer's contract is non-trivial, however, when shelf space is scarce.
If negotiations with manufacturer Y have failed, so that the retailer only has a contract with manufacturer X, we denote the retailer's quantity choice by x * (T X ), where
We refer to R X (x * ) − T X (x * ) as the retailer's disagreement payoff with manufacturer Y .
And if negotiations with manufacturer X have failed, so that the retailer only has a contract with manufacturer Y, we denote the retailer's quantity choice by y * (T Y ), where
We refer to R Y (y * ) − T Y (y * ) as the retailer's disagreement payoff with manufacturer X.
Stage three-negotiations with manufacturer j
Negotiations between the retailer and manufacturer j occur in stage three. We assume for now that j = Y (later we endogenize the order of negotiations). Thus, in stage three, given the retailer's equilibrium behavior in stage four, and assuming the retailer and manufacturer X negotiate T X in stage two, the retailer and manufacturer Y will choose T Y to solve
such that manufacturer Y earns λ Y times the difference between its joint payoff with the retailer when T Y is in place and the retailer's disagreement payoff with manufacturer Y :
Given any
from (4) and (5) that the retailer and manufacturer Y will choose a contract in stage three that induces the retailer to choose their joint payoff-maximizing quantities in stage four:
If there is no contract between the retailer and manufacturer X, then the retailer and
It is straightforward to show that for any optimal T Y in this case, the retailer chooses y * ∈ max y≥0 Π(0, y) in stage three. The retailer's payoff is then
and manufacturer X's payoff is zero.
Stage two-negotiations with manufacturer i
Negotiations between the retailer and manufacturer i occur in stage two. Let i = X. Then, given the retailer's equilibrium behavior in stage four, and the retailer and manufacturer Y 's equilibrium behavior in stage three, the retailer and manufacturer X will choose T X to solve
subject to the retailer's preferring to negotiate with manufacturer Y in stage three,
contract T Y 's inducing the retailer to choose (x * * , y * * ) such that
and manufacturer X's earning a payoff of λ X times the difference between its joint payoff with the retailer when both contracts are in place and the retailer's disagreement payoff,
where π Y satisfies (5).
The program in (7)- (10) implies that the retailer and manufacturer X will choose T X to maximize the difference between the overall joint payoff of all three firms and manufacturer Y 's profit, subject to manufacturer Y 's earning non-negative profit, x * * and y * * maximizing the retailer's joint payoff with manufacturer Y , and manufacturer X's earning its bargaining share of the retailer's gains from trade with it. In solving this program, it is useful to note that x * , x * * , y * * , and π Y can be viewed as functions only of T x , and that since manufacturer X and the retailer can always negotiate a quantity-forcing contract that restricts the retailer's choices in the final stage, one can think of the retailer and manufacturer X's problem as essentially that of choosing x * , x * * , y * * , T X (x * * ), and T X (x * ) to maximize Π(x * * , y * * ) − π Y , subject to several conditions. These conditions are that (i) all firms earn non-negative profit,
(ii) each manufacturer earns its bargaining share of the retailer's gains from trade with it, (iii) y * * maximizes the retailer's joint payoff with manufacturer Y , (iv) the retailer chooses (x * , 0) over (x * * , 0) when it only has a contract with manufacturer X, and (v) the retailer chooses (x * * , y * * ) over (x * , y) for any y ≥ 0 when it has contracts with both manufacturers.
(We state these conditions formally in the proof of Proposition 1.)
Of these last two conditions, (iv) does not bind in equilibrium since the incentives of the retailer and manufacturer X are to decrease payments for x * in order to extract surplus from manufacturer Y . But condition (v), the requirement that (x * * , y * * ) be chosen over (x * , y)
for y ≥ 0, may bind. From (5) and condition (v), we see that the retailer and manufacturer X will extract surplus from manufacturer Y by decreasing T x (x * ) as long as π Y > 0 and
is satisfied. If they are able to extract fully all the surplus from manufacturer Y before (11) binds, then π Y = 0 and the joint payoff of the retailer and manufacturer X is Π(x * * , y * * ), which is maximized by choosing T X such that (x * * , y * * ) ∈ arg max x,y≥0 Π(x, y). However, if (11) binds before surplus extraction is complete, then the best the retailer and manufacturer
where the first line is manufacturer Y 's payoff as given in (5), and the second line is obtained from the first line under the assumption that (11) binds. In this case, the joint payoff of the retailer and manufacturer X is Π(x * * , y
which is maximized by choosing T X such that (x * * , y * * ) ∈ arg max x,y≥0 Π(x, y) and
. It follows that overall joint payoff will be maximized in stage two whether or not (11) binds, and that manufacturer Y 's payoff will
, whichever is larger.
Thus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For any T X (·) that solves the program in (7)-(10), payoffs are given bỹ Manufacturer Y earns the maximum of zero and
These payoffs will be used in the next section to determine whether a retailer should build one or two slots, and to examine the role slotting allowances play in this decision.
For now, we simply note that Proposition 1 implies that the retailer's product line decisions always maximize joint profit conditional on the available shelf space. That is, if shelf space is plentiful, then the retailer will carry both products and sell positive amounts of each if and only if an unconstrained fully-integrated firm would do so. And if shelf space is scarce, then the retailer will carry the product that has the higher stand-alone monopoly profit. Thus, if shelf space is scarce and Π X > Π Y , then the retailer will carry product X, and vice-versa.
Slotting allowances and scarce shelf space
We want to know whether, and under what conditions, the retailer will build only one slot of shelf space. From Proposition 1 we know that if the retailer builds two slots, then the overall payoff in the continuation game is Π XY = Π X + Π Y , but if the retailer builds only one slot, then the overall payoff is Π XY = max{Π X , Π Y }. Of course, the retailer can expect to obtain a relatively larger share of the latter payoff, which implies that it faces a tradeoff in its stage one decision; it can have a larger share of a smaller overall profit, or it can have a smaller share of a larger overall profit. As we now show, the tradeoff depends on the ratio of Π X to Π Y , the bargaining parameters, and whether slotting allowances are feasible.
Since the products are unrelated, and each manufacturer needs at most one slot to satisfy the demand for its product, it should be clear that a manufacturer cannot gain from buying more than one slot in an effort to foreclose the other manufacturer when shelf space is plentiful. Hence, we can simplify the exposition by noting at the outset that there is no role for slotting allowances when the number of products matches the number of available slots.
Stage one-retailer's shelf-space decision
If shelf space is plentiful, then R(x, y) = R X (x) + R Y (y), and thus from Proposition 1, we have that in any equilibrium in which shelf space is plentiful,
It follows that in any equilibrium in which shelf space is plentiful manufacturer Y earns λ Y Π Y , manufacturer X earns λ X Π X , and the retailer earns
Notice that when shelf space is plentiful, manufacturer X's contract has no effect on the negotiations between the retailer and manufacturer Y (nor would manufacturer Y 's contract affect negotiations between the retailer and manufacturer X if manufacturer Y negotiated first). This implies that the order in which the retailer negotiates with the manufacturers does not affect equilibrium payoffs. To understand this result, note that x * * = x * when shelf space is plentiful (and the products are independent), and similarly y * * = y * . This means that there is no way for the retailer and first manufacturer to structure their contract to extract surplus from the second manufacturer when shelf space is plentiful.
In contrast, the order of negotiations does matter for equilibrium payoffs if shelf space is scarce. To see this, suppose slotting allowances are not feasible, and consider which manufacturer the retailer prefers to negotiate with first when Π Y > Π X and shelf space is scarce. If it negotiates first with manufacturer X, then from Proposition 1 we have that
It follows that if the retailer negotiates with manufacturer X first, shelf space is scarce, and the retailer retains control of its shelf space, then manufacturer Y earns max{0,
If the retailer negotiates first with manufacturer Y , then we can show using Proposition 1 (and relabeling the subscripts so that X replaces Y and vice versa) that if the retailer negotiates with manufacturer Y first, shelf space is scarce, and the retailer retains control of its shelf space, then manufacturer X earns zero, manufacturer Y earns
and the retailer earnsπ
Comparing the retailer's payoff in (12) with its payoff in (13), we see that if the retailer negotiates first with manufacturer X and max x≥0 R X (x) ≥ Π Y , so that manufacturer Y 's surplus is fully extracted, then the retailer's payoff is (1 − λ X λ Y )Π Y , which exceeds its payoff in (13) for all λ X < 1. And if max x≥0 R X (x) < Π Y , so that manufacturer Y 's surplus is not fully extracted, then the retailer's payoff is
, which also exceeds its payoff in (13) for all λ X < 1 (since max x≥0 R X (x) > Π X ). It follows that if Π Y > Π X , shelf space is scarce, and λ X < 1, then the retailer prefers to negotiate with manufacturer X first. Intuitively, the overall joint payoff is Π Y independent of the order of negotiations. This means that, in choosing which manufacturer to negotiate with first, maximizing the retailer's payoff is equivalent to minimizing the sum of the manufacturers' payoffs. By negotiating with manufacturer X first, T X (·) can be structured so that the retailer's disagreement payoff when it negotiates with manufacturer Y is max x≥0 R X (x).
But if the retailer negotiates with manufacturer Y first, then the retailer's disagreement payoff is only (1 − λ X )Π X , which is what it would earn if product Y did not exist. Since
rent shifting is clearly more effective if the retailer negotiates
with manufacturer X first. Unless all rent-shifting gains accrue to manufacturer X (i.e., λ X = 1), it follows that the retailer is better off negotiating with manufacturer X first.
Comparing the retailer's payoff in (12) with its payoff in any equilibrium in which shelf space is plentiful, 
equality is strict and λ X < 1, then the retailer builds one slot in all equilibria.
We can understand Proposition 2 as follows. The tradeoff for the retailer is whether to build one slot of shelf space in order to capture a larger share of a smaller overall profit pie or two slots of shelf space in order to capture a smaller share of a larger overall profit pie. Since the difference in the overall profit pies is Π X , it follows that the larger is Π X , the less likely it is that the retailer will opt to build one slot, all else equal. For a given Π X , the larger is λ Y , the smaller is the retailer's share of the pie when shelf space is plentiful. Although the retailer's share of the pie is also decreasing in λ Y when shelf space is scarce, the magnitude of the decrease is not as dramatic given the possibilities for rent shifting. Thus, a larger value of λ Y makes it more likely that the retailer will opt to build only one slot, all else equal.
It is sometimes alleged that the scarcity of shelf space found in practice is a disequilibrium phenomenon that will be self-correcting in the long run. Proposition 2 implies otherwise;
it says that a shortage of shelf space can emerge in equilibrium as a consequence of profitmaximizing behavior by a retailer with market power. It follows that as long as there exist barriers to entry that protect long-run profits, shelf-space shortages will not be self-correcting. On the other hand, with better understanding, it may be possible to affect things at the margin through appropriate public policy. One practice that has been under scrutiny, but for which the prevailing legal climate is permissive, is slotting allowances. In what follows we show that slotting allowances may actually be contributing to the scarcity of shelf space.
The role of slotting allowances in the retailer's shelf-space decision
We model slotting allowances as follows. After observing whether shelf space is plentiful or scarce, manufacturers have the opportunity to purchase slots by offering slotting allowances.
Given our assumptions, neither manufacturer has any incentive to purchase two slots, and so if shelf space is plentiful, it is straightforward to show that slotting allowances will not arise.
However, if shelf space is scarce, then one manufacturer will necessarily be excluded, and so manufacturers may have no choice but to compete for the retailer's patronage by offering to pay for shelf space. In this case, let S X denote manufacturer X's offer and S Y denote manufacturer Y 's offer. One can think of S X and S Y as lump-sum payments offered to the retailer in exchange for shelf space of fixed width (a slot) and for a certain duration (the rest of the game). Since the retailer has only one slot, it can accept at most one manufacturer's offer, where acceptance implies that the slot is reserved for that manufacturer's product.
If no offer is accepted, then the slot remains under the retailer's control and the rest of the game proceeds as above (for ease of exposition, we focus on the case in which the retailer can choose the order of negotiations). If an offer is accepted, then the retailer and the manufacturer whose offer was accepted choose their remaining contract terms to maximize their joint payoff, with each receiving its bargaining share of the gains from trade.
It follows that if the retailer accepts manufacturer X's offer, then the retailer's payoff is If no offer is accepted, then the retailer's payoff is given in (12), manufacturer X earns
Solving the game with slotting allowances is straightforward. If Π Y > Π X , then there is no equilibrium in which shelf space is scarce and the retailer accepts manufacturer X's offer. 14 This is because the retailer and manufacturer Y 's joint payoff in any such equilibrium is bounded above by Π X (the retailer's payoff is less than or equal to Π X and manufacturer Y 's payoff is zero), which implies that there exists
By offering an S Y that satisfies these inequalities, manufacturer Y can induce the retailer to accept its offer and make itself better off. Hence there cannot be an equilibrium in which the retailer accepts manufacturer X's offer and sells product X.
Similarly, if λ X , λ Y > 0 then there is no equilibrium in which shelf space is scarce and the retailer rejects both offers: if the retailer rejects both offers, then the joint payoff of the retailer and manufacturer Y in the continuation game is 
manufacturer Y 's payoff is Π Y −π b , and manufacturer X's payoff is zero
Comparing the retailer's payoff in (14) with its payoff in (12), we see that, conditional on shelf space being scarce, the retailer is weakly better off when slotting allowances are feasible than when they are not. And, if
then the retailer is strictly better off with slotting allowances. Intuitively, the retailer is weakly better off when slotting allowances are feasible because it can always reject both offers and guarantee itself the payoff in (12), and it can be strictly better off (e.g., when
λ X , λ Y = 1) because slotting allowances force the weaker manufacturer to compete away its entire profit even if this manufacturer would otherwise have all or most of the bargaining power vis a vis the retailer. Moreover, since the retailer can always choose whether to restrict its shelf space, it follows that slotting allowances cannot make the retailer worse off.
An immediate implication of this result is that slotting allowances expand the set of parameter values over which the retailer prefers to limit its shelf space. In particular, suppose slotting allowances make the retailer better off conditional on shelf space being scarce, so that the retailer's payoff in this case is Π X . In this case, if
the retailer's payoff when shelf space is scarce exceeds its payoff when shelf space is plentiful.
It follows that if slotting allowances are feasible and Π Y > Π X , then the retailer prefers to build one slot of shelf space if and only if λ X < 1 and 
inequality is strict, then the retailer builds one slot of shelf space in all equilibria.
Proposition 3 shows that slotting allowances may actually be contributing to the scarcity of shelf space. This runs counter to the conventional view that slotting allowances arise in response to shelf space being scarce. Here we show that the causality can also go the other way-the scarcity of shelf space may, in part, be due to the availability of slotting allowances.
We illustrate the differences between Proposition 2 (where slotting allowances are not Slotting allowances contribute to the scarcity of shelf space because they provide the retailer with an additional means of rent shifting when shelf space is scarce. The idea is that in selling its shelf space upfront, the retailer creates a tournament among the manufacturers where the winner must give the retailer at least what the latter could earn if it gave the space to the loser. This guarantees for the retailer a payoff equal to the smaller of the two stand-alone monopoly profits (the weaker manufacturer earns zero profit). Note that without slotting allowances, the retailer has no such guarantee. Whether shelf space is plentiful or scarce, the retailer's payoff in the absence of slotting allowances is decreasing in the manufacturers' bargaining powers and is zero if the manufacturers can make take-it-orleave-it offers. In contrast, the retailer always earns positive payoff with slotting allowances.
Thus, we see that slotting allowances may contribute to the scarcity of shelf space and be particularly valuable to retailers that have little bargaining power (where λ X , λ Y are large).
Bargaining power and slotting allowances
The retailer's decision whether to limit its shelf space, and the extent to which the availability of slotting allowances contributes to this decision, depends on the retailer's bargaining power with respect to each manufacturer. Surprisingly, we see from Proposition 3 that there is an inverse relationship between the retailer's bargaining power with respect to each manufacturer and whether slotting allowances arise in equilibrium. Slotting allowances are less likely to arise in equilibrium when the retailer has more bargaining power (when λ X and λ Y are low) because with higher bargaining power the focus of the retailer shifts toward maximizing the overall profit rather than limiting its shelf space to extract rent. Slotting allowances do not arise, for example, if the retailer can make take-it or leave-it offers to each manufacturer (λ X = λ Y = 0). This may explain why a retailer like Wal-Mart, which has high bargaining power vis a vis its suppliers, allegedly does not avail itself of these payments.
We call this the 'Wal-Mart phenomenon.' The idea is that the usual tradeoff facing a retailer in stage one, whether to opt for a larger share of a smaller overall profit or a smaller share of a larger overall profit, does not apply to Wal-Mart because it can already capture most or all of the profit. Hence, Wal-Mart prefers to have plentiful shelf space.
The Wal-Mart phenomenon is somewhat unusual in that Wal-Mart's bargaining power is reputed to be high even in the presence of large, powerful manufacturers (it seemingly does not matter whether Wal-Mart is dealing with small manufacturers of produce, or large manufacturers of differentiated, consumer-packaged goods). More generally, however, one can imagine that a given retailer may have high bargaining power with respect to some suppliers and some product classes, but low bargaining power with respect to other suppliers and other product classes. If one thinks of the retailer as delegating stocking decisions to its category managers, so that shelf space decisions are localized (for example, products that require freezer space are competing only against themselves and not against products that do not need refrigeration), then it is possible that a given retailer may be strategically limiting its shelf space and obtaining slotting allowances for some product categories, while not limiting its shelf space and thus not obtaining slotting allowances for other product categories. In this case, our results imply that the incidence of slotting allowances will be higher for those product categories in which the manufacturers have relatively more bargaining power.
Conditional on observing slotting allowances, one might think that a retailer with more bargaining power will obtain a larger slotting allowance than one with less bargaining power.
It turns out that this intuition holds for some bargaining parameters, but overall the relationship between a retailer's bargaining power and the size of the slotting allowance is non-monotonic. To see this, recall that the retailer's payoff when shelf space is scarce is
which implicitly defines S Y . Subtracting (1 − λ Y )Π Y from both sides of this condition gives
from which it follows that S Y is increasing in λ Y but weakly decreasing in λ X (strictly decreasing if the retailer's payoff exceeds Π X ).
15 Intuitively, the larger is λ X , the smaller is the retailer's disagreement payoff if it rejects both offers and thus the smaller is the slotting allowance that manufacturer Y will offer. On the other hand, the larger is λ Y the less the retailer will earn in the continuation game if it accepts manufacturer Y 's offer, and hence the more manufacturer Y will have to offer upfront in the form of a slotting allowance.
As an example of how the bargaining parameters interact, consider the case in which , which equals its payoff with two slots. Thus, it follows that slotting allowances will be non-zero for all parameter values for which the retailer strictly prefers to limit its shelf space to one slot. equal. Then, if the retailer's payoff exceeds Π X , we have that slotting allowances will initially be increasing in the retailer's bargaining power and then decreasing, obtaining a maximum
Slotting allowances, welfare, and profits
Our results have implications for social welfare and the distribution of firm profits (who gains and who loses). Notice that if shelf space is plentiful, then the retailer sells both products and the overall joint payoff is Π X + Π Y . But if shelf space is scarce, then the retailer sells only product Y and the overall joint payoff is Π Y . In both cases, consumers face monopoly prices, which is true whether or not slotting allowances are feasible. Thus, conditional on the availability of shelf space, it follows that slotting allowances do not affect product selection or retail prices. However, as we have seen, slotting allowances do affect whether shelf space is scarce. In particular, we see from Propositions 2 and 3 that when slotting allowances are feasible, the retailer is more likely to limit its shelf space (see region B in Figure 1 ).
When this happens (i.e., when parameter values are in this region), consumers are worse off with slotting allowances than without. Without slotting allowances, consumers would be able to select from among products X and Y , each priced at the monopoly price. With slotting allowances, consumers would only be able to select product Y , and there would be no change in product Y 's price. Since overall firm profits are also lower in region B with slotting allowances than without, it follows that welfare is unambiguously lower in this region.
Turning to the distribution of firm profits, the retailer is weakly better off with slotting allowances, and when Π Y > Π X , manufacturer X is weakly worse off. Slotting allowances add to the retailer's profit when the losing manufacturer's stand-alone monopoly profit exceeds what the retailer could earn if it rejected both offers or built two slots of shelf space. Given Π Y > Π X , it follows that slotting allowances contribute to the retailer's profit if and only if Π X is larger than the retailer's payoff in (12), which for max x≥0 R X (x) ≥ Π Y , implies that
, and larger than its payoff when shelf space is plentiful, which implies
The upper envelope of these two inequalities is shown in Figure 2 . For all points in regions A 0 and B, the retailer is better off with slotting allowances. For all points in regions A and C, the retailer is indifferent to slotting allowances. Thus, for a given λ Y , the retailer is more likely to gain from slotting allowances the larger is Π X relative to Π Y (the higher is the guaranteed payoff from slotting allowances). And, for a given ratio of Π X to Π Y , the retailer is more likely to gain from slotting allowances the larger is λ Y (the higher is manufacturer Y 's bargaining power). Since manufacturer X's profit decreases to zero when slotting allowances are feasible and shelf space is scarce, manufacturer X is worse off in regions A, A 0 , and B. There is no change in its profit in region C because shelf space is plentiful in this case with or without slotting allowances. 
retailer better off Y better off X worse off welfare no change 
Conclusion
Slotting allowances have become a major issue in antitrust policy circles. They have been the subject of numerous congressional hearings and they have been the focal point of two recent Federal Trade Commission reports on marketing practices in the retail grocery industry.
Although some commentators view slotting allowances as being anticompetitive, while others see them as being procompetitive, many if not most commentators believe that the growth in slotting allowances can be attributed to the imbalance between the number of available products (new products and established products) for the retailer to choose from, and the number of products the retailer can adequately carry given the finiteness of its shelf space, i.e., given the scarcity of shelf space. In contrast, we have shown that causal linkages may also go the other way; slotting allowances may be contributing to scarcity of shelf space.
In our model, slotting allowances can be viewed as a rent-shifting mechanism, allowing the retailer to capture more efficiently the value of its shelf space when shelf space is scarce. By itself, this effect is welfare neutral. Slotting allowances in this case serve only to transfer rents from the weaker manufacturer to the stronger manufacturer and, for some parameters, from the weaker manufacturer to the retailer. However, the problem is that this same mechanism may also induce the retailer to limit its shelf space when the shelf space would otherwise be plentiful. This effect tends to reduce welfare and can harm both manufacturers. Welfare falls when shelf space is scarce because consumers suffer from reduced product choice but do not benefit from lower prices. The manufacturers are worse off when shelf space would otherwise be plentiful because overall joint profit is lower, but the retailer's profit is higher.
Our results point to a new source of welfare loss. Previously, policy makers have been concerned with whether slotting allowances lead to higher or lower retail prices, and whether dominant manufacturers might abuse slotting allowances by buying up scarce shelf space in order to foreclose smaller rivals with better products. These concerns have caused policy makers in specific cases to consider whether the excluded firms have equal access to capital markets, whether slotting allowances are coupled with exclusivity provisions (e.g., does the dominant firm require that the downstream firm not sell its competitor's product), and whether there are scale economies in production that may prevent an excluded firm from effectively competing elsewhere in the marketplace. However, in our model, there is no effect on retail pricing, and the better product is always chosen conditional on the availability of shelf space. Instead, we find that welfare may be lower because slotting allowances may induce the retailer to limit its shelf space. This suggests that slotting allowances may be harmful even if they are not accompanied by exclusivity provisions, the market does not exhibit economies of scale in production, and access to capital markets is not an issue.
Our results also have testable implications. In a recent study on slotting allowances, the Federal Trade Commission (2003) concluded that, "For the five product categories during the time periods of this study, the surveyed retailers' data on the frequency of slotting fees varied widely between and within product categories, across retailers, and across a particular retailer's regions." (p.vi) And, "For the seven retailers during the time periods of this study, slotting allowances were more prevalent for ice cream and salad dressing products than for bread and hot dog products." (p.vii) In some instances, the Federal Trade Commission found that slotting allowances were paid on all new products in a particular category, whereas in other categories they found that few if any slotting allowances were paid on new products.
We suggest that these findings may be due to differences in the retailers' bargaining powers with respect to each manufacturer and with respect to each other. In particular, we have
shown that the incidence of slotting allowances may be inversely related to each retailer's bargaining power. If a retailer has all the bargaining power with respect to each manufacturer, then the retailer extracts all the available surplus in the market place independent of the order of negotiations and slotting allowances do not arise. However, if the manufacturers have all the bargaining power with respect to the retailer, then slotting allowances will arise because the retailer will want to limit its shelf space in order to earn positive payoff. For intermediate levels of bargaining power, the retailer is more likely to limit its shelf space (and therefore slotting allowances are more likely to arise) the less bargaining power the retailer has. This accords well with the observation that slotting allowances tend to arise for items such as ice cream and salad dressing where strong brand names exist, but not for items such as bread and hot dogs. This also accords well with the observation that Wal-Mart, perhaps the retailer with the most bargaining power, allegedly does not accept slotting allowances.
We have also shown that there is a non-monotonic relationship between a retailer's bargaining power and the magnitude of any slotting allowances it receives. Retailers with low bargaining power vis a vis their suppliers will tend to negotiate roughly the same level of slotting allowances as retailers with high bargaining power, whereas retailers with moderate bargaining power will be able to negotiate the highest slotting allowances. In principle, these findings can be tested. But, to our knowledge, the data needed to do so does not yet exist.
B Appendix: Robustness
In this appendix, we consider an alternative specification of the game. We assume that if shelf space is scarce and manufacturer i buys the shelf space, then manufacturer i can decide to allow the retailer to sell its rival's product (and not its own product). We show that in this environment it is still the case that when slotting allowances are feasible, the retailer restricts its shelf space over a wider range of parameter values than when slotting allowances are not feasible.
To see this, assume that Π Y > Π X and λ Y < 1. Note that if shelf space is scarce and manufacturer X buys the slot, then the joint payoff of the retailer and manufacturer X when product X is sold is Π X . In this case, manufacturer X's payoff is λ X Π X − S X .
However, if product Y is sold, then as described in Section 4, manufacturer Y 's payoff is max{0, λ Y (Π Y − max x≥0 R X (x))}, and so the joint payoff of the retailer and manufacturer X is Π Y − max {0, λ Y (Π Y − max x≥0 R X (x))} , and manufacturer X's payoff is
Note that
where the first inequality uses max x≥0 R X (x) ≥ Π X and the second inequality uses Π Y > Π X and λ Y < 1. Thus,
and so manufacturer X strictly prefers to allow product Y to be sold.
This implies that the retailer's profit in (14) becomes
where we replace Π X in (14) with the new joint payoff Π Y −max {0, λ Y (Π Y − max x≥0 R X (x))} .
Note that if max
with a strict inequality when λ X λ Y > 0. It follows that in this case, Comparing the retailer's payoff in (B1) with its payoff in (12), we see that, conditional on shelf space being scarce, the retailer is weakly better off when slotting allowances are feasible than when they are not. And, by the arguments above, if λ X λ Y > 0, the retailer is strictly better off with slotting allowances. 
